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Boards and Sustainable Value Creation: The Legal Entity, 
Co-Determination and Other Means
JEROEN VELDMAN*
Abstract
Boards of directors face growing pressures to engage with systemic risks and sustain-
able value creation. In this article I explore how an entity view in company law pro-
vides a consideration of the status, architecture and purpose of the modern corporation 
that theoretically offers the capacity to integrate such issues in corporate strategy. I 
also explore how specific models of corporate architecture such as co-determination 
relate to such an entity view. Exploring different perspectives on the VW case I show 
how a dominant view of corporate governance conflicts with the assumptions under-
lying co-determination. In relation to these issues I argue that the entity view and 
co-determination do not provide panacea for the reform of corporate governance 
theory and practice, but provide conceptual building blocks that may be used to 
engage in a creative way with notions of status, architecture and purpose in order to 
enhance the capacity for company directors to engage with systemic risks and sustain-
able value creation in corporate strategy.
Keywords
Corporate governance, sustainable value creation, long-termism, sustainability, cor-
porate architecture, corporate purpose, co-determination, separate legal entity, entity 
view, systemic risk, Volkswagen scandal
1. Introduction
Growing numbers of regulators, business leaders, academics and pundits argue that 
a dominant model for corporate governance that focuses attention exclusively on 
short-term oriented shareholders and managerial executives lies at the heart of a broad 
set of risks. These risks include reputational, litigation, insurance, finance, opera-
tional, innovation and market risks as well as systemic risks such as resource deple-
tion, climate change, market instability, the reshaping of labour markets and growing 
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social inequality.1 In turn, this spectrum of risks is perceived to lead to a decline of 
public trust in corporations and a potential increase in regulatory responses.2 Despite 
the development of a broad range of responses such as corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and corporate citizenship initiatives; the United Nations Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (UNSDGs); stewardship initiatives for institutional investors; industry 
platform initiatives to enable sustainable development; and regulatory interventions 
like ESG reporting and due diligence in value chains, only limited change may be 
observed. And there is a pervasive sense in relevant actor communities, including 
corporate directors, investors and regulators that, despite their constitutive roles in 
the field, these actor communities consider themselves only limitedly capable to 
reshape the factors that condition how much space they have to engage with such 
risks.3
In this article I argue that at least part of this lack of progress and sense of incapac-
ity may be attributed to the continued adoption and application of a theory of corpo-
rate governance, which conceives of the status, architecture4 and purpose of the 
modern corporation in a highly stylized and very limited way The adoption of this 
theory is constitutive for the extent to which interests and risks pertaining to actors 
and time-frames may be considered in corporate strategy. To engage with the issues 
posed by the dominance of this theoretical setup, I will take a closer look at how 
competing theories perceive of corporate status, architecture and purpose; how such 
competing views frame the role, position, and discretionary space for corporate boards 
and, ultimately, how such competing views allow the corporate board to engage with 
risks and interests pertaining to broader actors, interests, and time-frames than short-
term oriented shareholders and managerial executives alone.
In section two I start with the exploration of an ‘entity view’, which, in principle, 
allows for the inclusion of a broad definition of actors, interests and risks, and time-
frames. I explore how such an entity view provides the basis for the development of 
ideas of corporate architecture, including a co-determination model. I then discuss 
how the dominant theory of corporate governance comprehensively reimagines the 
status, architecture and purpose of the modern corporation and thereby prioritizes the 
interests of short-term market value-oriented shareholders and executive managers, 
1 John Kay, Other People’s Money: The Real Business of Finance (New York: Public Affairs, 2015); 
Kate Raworth, Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist (London: 
Random House, 2017); Leo E Strine Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to Do the Right Thing 4 Harv.
Bus.L.Rev. 235 (2014); Jeroen Veldman, Paige Morrow, Filip Gregor, Corporate Governance for a 
Changing World: Final Report of a Global Roundtable Series (Brussels and London: Frank Bold and 
Cass Business School, 2016); at <https://www.economist.com/business/2017/08/31/the-parable-of-st-
paul>.
2 Robert B Reich, Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few (London: Icon Books, 2016).
3 Jeroen Veldman, Paige Morrow, Filip Gregor, Corporate Governance for a Changing World: 
Final Report of a Global Roundtable Series (Brussels and London: Frank Bold and Cass Business 
School, 2016).
4 Jeroen Veldman and Hugh Willmott, Social Ontology and the Modern Corporation 41 Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics (2017); Brian Cheffins, History and the Global Corporate Governance 
Revolution: The UK Perspective 43 Business History 92 (2001).
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while relegating the risks and interests of broader actors and time-frames to the status 
of ‘externalities’.
In section three I apply these competing views to the VW scandal, exploring how 
these competing views can be used to provide two very different assessments of this 
case, either as a case that exemplifies a failure of governance induced by a multiplic-
ity of goals and interests in corporate strategizing, or as a case in which the tenets of 
the dominant view of corporate governance themselves provided the basis for ignor-
ing the corporate and societal risks involved in the business model adopted at VW.
In the discussion I then assess the potential for the entity view and a model for 
corporate architecture like co-determination to provide a comprehensive alternative 
to the currently dominant conception of corporate governance. I argue that the entity 
view provides a theoretical point of departure that allows to significantly expand the 
perception of discretionary space and the scope for directors’ duties, but that it suffers 
from a number of problems, including the fact that it does not provide a positive con-
ception of purpose. Similarly, co-determination provides an elegant and effective 
conceptualization of corporate architecture that enables the inclusion of the interests 
and risks of broader actors and time-frames into corporate architectures, but a suc-
cessful implementation of co-determination is path-dependent and contingent upon 
a continuing close fit with both corporate-level and state-level arrangements. Given 
these issues, I argue that neither the entity theory nor a corporate architecture based 
on co-determination provide panacea for the redevelopment of corporate governance 
theory and practice. Rather, consideration of these ideas provides building blocks for 
the further development of notions of status, architecture and purpose that allow to 
strengthen and support the capacity for boards to consider risks and interests of 
broader actors and time-frames in corporate governance.
2. Entity, Architecture, and Purpose
At the end of 2012 VW received an ‘Ethics in Business Award’ from the World Forum 
for Ethics in Business because of Volkswagen’s admirable efforts in the fields of 
environmental management and corporate social responsibility. And the CEO of VW 
Winterkorn wrote in the VW 2014 Sustainability Report that “sustainability, environ-
mental protection, and social responsibility can be powerful value drivers.”5 As the 
subsequent scandal makes assumptions about the prevalence of ethics, culture and 
‘tone from the top’ as ‘powerful value drivers’ rather problematic, I turn to the field 
of corporate governance to explore how the historical development of the modern 
corporation as a social construct provided changing conceptions of status, architecture 
and purpose and that provided different framings for boards to consider the interests 
and risks of actors, interests, and time-frames in corporate strategy.
5 Carl Rhodes, Democratic Business Ethics: Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal and the Disruption 
of Corporate Sovereignty 37 Organization Studies 1503 (2016).
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In this respect it is noticeable that company law in every jurisdiction around the 
world perceives of the status and architecture of public corporations as different from 
other types of legal and organizational representations, including the unlimited liabil-
ity partnership that provided the dominant model for the organization of private busi-
ness ventures until the start of the nineteenth century6. In the unlimited liability 
partnership, the position of shareholders was characterized by unlimited liability, 
which meant that those investing their money accepted a considerable amount of risk 
and, therefore, had a direct interest in their involvement in the management func-
tion7. The modern public corporation, by contrast, is premised on a very different 
architecture.
During the 19th century, the development of the public corporation led to the dis-
persal of shareholdings and an increasing de facto externalization of shareholders 
from the management of the corporation. This externalization of the shareholders 
provided two interconnected reasons for the development of a professional and inde-
pendent corporate board with duties directed toward a corporate ‘entity’.
First, the separation of shareholders from the management function was the condi-
tion by which a fully reified separate legal entity with its own, separate, attributions 
of ownership, liabilities and agency could develop. The reification of this entity, in 
turn, allowed for the development of a specific ‘architecture’ for the public corpora-
tion that provided considerable capacities, privileges and protections to rentier share-
holders specifically.8 A full separation of the shareholder constituency from the 
management function was, therefore, a structural condition that enabled considerable 
differential outcomes for shareholders as a reconstituted constituency.
Second, the distancing of shareholders from the management function created the 
potential for the formation of a professional board, rather than one necessarily com-
posed out of shareholders as in the unlimited liability partnership. However, the for-
mation of such a professional board introduced considerable difficulties in terms of 
establishing a clear objective. Considering the broad varieties of types of sharehold-
ers and shareholder interests, and considering the considerable potential for majority 
and controlling shareholders to expropriate dispersed shareholders in these public 
corporations9, it was a logical step to direct the duties of the board toward the 
6 David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 University of St. Thomas Law Journal 13 (2014).
7 Mark Freeman, Robin Pearson and James Taylor, Shareholder Democracies?: Corporate Gov-
ernance in Britain and Ireland before 1850 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Paul John-
son. Making the Market: Victorian Origins of Corporate Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010).
8 These include perpetual time horizons, limited liability, protection against expropriation by major-
ity shareholders, professional management and a secondary share market. See Jeroen Veldman and 
Hugh Willmott, Social Ontology and the Modern Corporation 41 Cambridge Journal of Economics 
1492 (2017)
9 Mark Freeman, Robin Pearson and James Taylor, Shareholder Democracies?: Corporate Gov-
ernance in Britain and Ireland before 1850 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Paul John-
son. Making the Market: Victorian Origins of Corporate Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010).
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‘entity’, rather than toward a body of shareholders with diverse interests that was de 
facto and de jure separated from the management function.10
The combination of conceptual developments sketched here provides the basis for 
the development of a new and distinctly corporate architecture. As the shareholders 
shift to the status of an external constituency in order to receive significant differen-
tial advantages from a new architectural setup, and as the role and position of the 
corporate board is reconceived in relation to a fully reified separate legal entity to 
which the board owes its duties, it becomes apparent that both the status and the 
relative capacity of corporate constituencies to exercise rights and claims is now 
established in relation to a corporate architecture that revolves around the separate 
legal entity. The development of this new corporate architecture has significant effects 
for the position and role of the corporate board.
In this new corporate architecture, the corporate board is conceived as an ‘inde-
pendent institution’, a corporate constituency or ‘organ’11 with a status distinct from 
the shareholders: “[u]nder the received legal model … no one acts as agent of the 
shareholders … . The officers are agents of the board. The board, in turn, is conceived 
to be an independent institution, not directly responsible to shareholders in the man-
ner of an agent.”12 And as the board in this position is conceived as an ‘autonomous 
fiduciary’13 that stands at the ‘apex’14 of the corporation with its duties directed to the 
best interests of ‘the entity’, it enjoys broad discretionary space and may reject a priori 
claims by any particular constituency15. In effect, the board comes to operate in the 
role of a ‘mediating hierarch’, adjudicating between all actors, interests and time-
frames that make up the corporation in toto.16
In sum, the notion of a fully reified separate legal entity provides the basis for a 
new organizational architecture, in which the status of all corporate constituencies is 
both formally and functionally reconceptualized. It is in relation to this comprehensive 
reconceptualization that the corporate board attains a duty toward the ‘entity’, rather 
10 Jeroen Veldman and Hugh Willmott, The Corporation in Management Studies in Grietje Baars 
and Andre Spicer (eds.), Critical Corporation Handbook, 198-199 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017).
11 KJM Cremers and Simone M Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards 68 Stanford 
Law Review 67, 84 (2016); Antoine Rebérioux, Does Shareholder Primacy Lead to a Decline in Mana-
gerial Accountability? 31 Cambridge Journal of Economics (2007).
12 Melvin A Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate 
Decisionmaking 57 California Law Review 5 (1969).
13 Luh L Lan and Loizos Heracleous, Rethinking Agency Theory: The View from Law 35 Academy 
of Management Review (2010)
14 Donald Nordberg and Terry McNulty, Creating Better Boards Through Codification: Possibilities 
and Limitations in UK Corporate Governance, 1992-2010 55 Business History 359 (2013).
15 David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 University of St. Thomas Law Journal 25 (2014)
16 Adolf A Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System 62 Columbia Law Review 433 
(1962).; David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 University of St. Thomas Law Journal 25 
(2014); Margaret M Blair and Lynn A Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law 85 Vir-
ginia Law Review (1999); EM Dodd Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees 45 Harvard Law 
Review (1931).
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than the shareholders; and, as a distinct and independent corporate organ, the discre-
tionary space to fulfill this duty.
As the development of this new architecture provided significant economic effects, 
and as these effects were connected to significant differential effects for shareholders, 
company law statutes in jurisdictions worldwide to this day adopt conceptions of 
status, architecture and purpose developed in relation to this ‘entity view’. This can 
be witnessed in the fact that Delaware courts do not mandate the provision of share-
holder value as the primary or only purpose of the public corporation17. Similarly 
“German corporate law requires that directors and executives take into consideration 
the interests of all parties (shareholders, employees, creditors, and business partners) 
participating in the running of the corporation – thereby militating against some forms 
of shareholder value.”18 As a result, German courts have supported the decisions of 
corporate officials (and of large shareholders) to override the demands of investors if 
they negatively affect the position of employees or threaten the existence of the cor-
poration.
In the Netherlands, the Corporate Governance Code is predicated on the notion 
that ‘a company is a long-term alliance between the various parties involved in the 
company’19. Principle 1.1 of the Code states: ‘The management board focuses on 
long-term value creation for the company and its affiliated enterprise, and takes into 
account the stakeholder interests that are relevant in this context.’ And under condi-
tions of M&A there is an explicit provision that “the target board should ultimately 
be guided by the interests of the (long-term) continuity of the company and its vari-
ous stakeholders, and thus not only by the interests of the shareholders.”20 This direc-
tion is reinforced by Dutch case law, as the Supreme Court argued that “The 
management board of a company, when fulfilling its obligations under statutory law 
or the articles, shall give precedence to the best interests of the company and the 
undertaking connected with it and shall in its decision-making take into account the 
interests of all stakeholders, among whom the shareholders are to be reckoned.”21 
Discretionary space for weighing these various interests is provided by a reasonable 
director standard22 enshrined in company law: “… the supervisory board is to act in 
the interest of the company and its enterprise, which is understood to mean to act in 
the interest of all stakeholders.”23
17 David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 University of St. Thomas Law Journal 4 (2014) 
quoting the Delaware corporate statute: “A corporation may be incorporated or organized under this 
chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes.” 
18 Michel Goyer, Contingent Capital: Short-Term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate Gov-
ernance in France and Germany, 89 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
19 Jaron Van Bekkum, Steven Hijink, Michael C Schouten and Jaap W Winter, Corporate Gover-
nance in the Netherlands 14 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1, 14 (2010)
20 Above at 23.
21 Netherlands Supreme Court 9 July 2009 (ASMI), para. 4.4.1 in Jaron Van Bekkum, Steven 
Hijink, Michael C Schouten and Jaap W Winter, Corporate Governance in the Netherlands 14 Elec-
tronic Journal of Comparative Law 1, 4 (2010).
22 Bekkum, Hijink, Schouten and Winter (2010) above at 7. 
23 Art. 140 Book 2 DCC in above at 4.
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In addition, the Netherlands has instituted an ‘Enterprise chamber’ as part of the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal. In relation to the argument that “setting the strategy of 
the company is the authority of the management board subject to the approval of the 
supervisory board and is not the power of the general meeting”,24 the Enterprise 
Chamber is charged with the capacity to provide the capacity for adjudication in the 
case of disagreement between shareholders, the board and/or the employee represen-
tatives. If no agreement can be reached between corporate constituencies it may 
provide far-reaching remedies, including “(i) nullification of one or more resolutions 
of a corporate body of the company; (ii) suspension or dismissal of one or more man-
aging or supervisory directors; (iii) appointment of one or more temporary managing 
or supervisory directors; (iv) temporary deviation from one or more provisions of the 
articles of association of the company; (v) temporary transfer of shares; and (vi) dis-
solution of the company (Article 356 Book 2 DCC).”25 The Enterprise Chamber thus 
provides an example of an institution that gives standing and the capacity to seek 
redress to all parties involved in corporate governance, including employees,26 as 
separate corporate constituencies or ‘organs’.
The entity view has found further application in co-determination models. In the 
Dutch and German corporate governance systems the employees, either directly or 
through a representative body like the works councils or trade unions, may elect or 
nominate directors for the supervisory board. In addition, they need to provide consent 
for decisions that affect them, such as pensions, working hours, remuneration systems 
and employment conditions.27 By conceiving of the employee constituency as a cor-
porate ‘organ’ with standing within the governance structure of the corporation, this 
conceptual setup reinforces the notion of corporate architecture provided by the entity 
view.
The examples provided show how an ‘entity view’ relates to the development of 
corporate architectures that allow, for the inclusion of interests and risks of broader 
actors and time-frames;28 for the development of institutions that may act as a forum 
for grievances; and for the development of comprehensive corporate governance 
models such as co-determination. Despite the appeal of the entity view, however, its 
adoption and implementation is impeded by three factors.
First, an entity view does not provide a positive conception of directors’ duties and 
does not provide guidance to the weighing of relative interests. Of course, one might 
argue that the capacity to establish and adjust corporate purpose under shifting cir-
cumstances, to mediate between competing interests, and to make decisions in the 
absence of an external yardstick is the hallmark of the professionalism and maturity 
24 Above at 14.
25 Above at 30.
26 Above at 16.
27 Above at 16.
28 Frank Jan De Graaf and Cor A Herkstroeter, How Corporate Social Performance is Institution-
alised Within the Governance Structure 74 Journal of Business Ethics 180 (2007).
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of any professional board member.29 Nevertheless, the argument that the absence of 
a positive conception of corporate purpose and directors’ duties unduly complicates 
the task and focus of the corporate board30 makes the adoption of a simple yardstick, 
such as shareholder primacy, seductive.31
The second issue is that in most jurisdictions shareholders retain the (qualified) 
right to appoint and dismiss directors at the AGM without cause;32 have a right of 
access to corporate books and records including the list of shareholders; and may 
bring derivative lawsuits against directors or officers in cases of harm done to ‘the 
corporation’.33 Although the existence of these legal rights does not provide share-
holders with direct claims to ownership or control;34 although commentators in the 
field of company law have argued that these rights are mostly the result of historical 
accident and oversight35; although many jurisdictions qualify these rights to a very 
considerable extent;36 and although in a two-tier board system the right to dismiss 
executive board members may be delegated to the supervisory board,37 the fact that 
these rights continue to be attributed to the shareholder constituency provides at least 
the basis for a suggestion that a prioritised position for shareholders in public corpo-
rations finds support in company law38.
The third issue complicating the adoption and implementation of an entity view is 
the development of a new theory of corporate governance that emerged from the 
Chicago Schools of Law and Economics. This new theory redefined the status of the 
modern corporation as a nexus of contracts, rather than as an entity; reimagined cor-
porate architecture as an exclusive dyadic and contractual arrangement between 
‘principals’ and ‘agents’; and reinterpreted corporate purpose exclusively as the pro-
29 Adrian Cadbury, Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002); Bob Garratt, Stop the Rot: Reframing Governance for Directors and Politi-
cians (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017); Robert I Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies, and 
Practices, 489 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
30 Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency 
and Over-Protection of Creditors 66 Modern Law Review (2003); Ruth V Aguilera and Gregory Jack-
son. Comparative and International Corporate Governance 4 Academy of Management Annals 485, 
500 (2010); but see Andrew Keay, Ascertaining The Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and 
Sustainability Model 71 Modern Law Review 687 (2008).
31 KJM Cremers and Simone M Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards 68 Stanford 
Law Review 67 (2016).
32 Kevin Levillain, Simon Parker, Rory Ridley-Duff, Blanche Segrestin, Jeroen Veldman and 
Hugh Willmott, Protecting Long-Term Commitment: Legal and Organizational Means in C Driver and 
G Thompson (eds.), Corporate Governance in Contention, 44 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
33 David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 University of St.Thomas Law Journal 13 (2014).
34 Michel Aglietta and Antoine Rebérioux, Corporate Governance Adrift: A Critique of Shareholder 
Value (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005).
35 David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 University of St.Thomas Law Journal 13 (2014);
36 Jaron Van Bekkum, Steven Hijink, Michael C Schouten and Jaap W Winter, Corporate Gover-
nance in the Netherlands 14 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1, 30 (2010).
37 David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 University of St.Thomas Law Journal 13 (2014).
38 Blanche Segrestin and Armand Hatchuel, Beyond Agency Theory, a Post-Crisis View of Corporate 
Law 22 British Journal of Management 490 (2011).
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duction of shareholder value39. Although the resulting shareholder primacy norm has 
been classified as a social norm, rather than as legal theory40, and although the con-
ceptual basis of this type of corporate governance theory has been criticised41 as 
“aspirational rather than grounded in corporate law”42, this new normative theory43 
with its stylistic reinterpretations of corporate status, architecture and purpose was 
highly successful in displacing entity view-based notions. The provision of a clear 
and unitary positive conception of corporate purpose in the form of the production of 
shareholder value, combined with a claim that adopting such a purpose would provide 
efficiencies and optimal social and economic utility, both for corporations and for 
societies, was quickly picked up and provided the basis for the development of cor-
porate governance institutions from the 1970s onwards.
In sum, the absence of a positive identification of purpose in entity theory; the 
perceived presence of prioritized rights to the shareholder constituency in company 
law; and strong, but unsubstantiated claims about the provision of greater efficiencies 
and associated overall social utility44 together provided the basis for the development 
and adoption of a new theory of corporate governance. These stylized ideas of status 
and architecture and reductive ideas of purpose in the form of shareholder primacy 
provided by this new theory became the basis for the development of institutions in 
the field of corporate governance, including business and law school curricula. The 
recognition by directors and executive managers that these normative assumptions, 
whether correct or not, guided their career fortunes and were central to their perceived 
capacity to deal with uncertainty and (litigation) risk, meant that from the 1970s 
onwards the entity view gradually lost terrain, while an exclusive and undivided 
directedness of executive managers’ and directors’ attention to shareholders’ interests 
39 MC Jensen & WH Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics (1976); see also Michel Aglietta and Antoine 
Rebérioux, Corporate Governance Adrift: A Critique of Shareholder Value (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2005).
40 Millon (2014) finds that “However accurate it might have been in the earlier nineteenth century 
in an age of closely held firms, an agency characterization of management’s relation to the sharehold-
ers has been completely inaccurate as a descriptive matter since the turn of the twentieth century and 
was still so in the later 1970s when corporate law academics first began to insist on it. Against this 
backdrop, the emergence of the agency claim and its widespread embrace as an assumed legal require-
ment are nothing short of astonishing.” David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 University of 
St. Thomas Law Journal 32-33 (2014); see also Luh L Lan and Loizos Heracleous, Rethinking Agency 
Theory: The View from Law 35 Academy of Management Review (2010).
41 Cremers and Sepe (2016) above at 142; Aguilera and Jackson (2010) above.
42 David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 University of St.Thomas Law Journal 33 (2014).
43 Andreas Jansson, Ulf Larsson Olaison, Jeroen Veldman and A Beverungen. Editorial: The Politi-
cal Economy of Corporate Governance 16 Ehemera (2016); H Hansmann, & R Kraakman, The End of 
History for Corporate Law 89 Georgetown Law Journal 439 (2001). 
44 H Hansmann, & R Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439 (2001).
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as the basis for corporate strategy gradually became an almost unavoidable social 
(rather than legal) norm45.
In the next section I explore the relevance of these views of corporate governance 
in relation to differing assessments of the causes and implications of the Volkswagen 
scandal.
3. The Volkswagen Scandal
The Volkswagen (VW) case provides an interesting example of the application of the 
new theory of corporate governance. Arguably, the VW case provides an egregious 
example of the failure of a corporation with a co-determination system in place, with 
massive costs to the corporation and to society as a result.46 For Elson et al. (2015), 
it is clear that the co-determination system per se was to blame for the emergence of 
the scandal at VW. They find that the issues at VW “can be explained in large part 
by problems arising from the composition and functioning of the company’s two-tier 
board (including the principle of “co-determination”) which “may have undermined 
the oversight function, and reduced attention to appropriate legal compliance.”47 and 
made “large-scale consideration of the company’s ethical posture ... secondary.”48. In 
their analysis the conditions in which governance at VW could derail were “... inher-
ent in the structure of the VW board”49 as co-determination as a governance system50 
is seen to produce a “conflict of interests and incentives inherent in the German 
model”51 that draw undue attention to “the individual interests of each party … re -
presented on the board”.52 It may then be surmised that “the German corporate orga-
nizational governance structure of co-determination creates an environment in which 
a corporation must juggle the conflicting interests of the shareholder and the labor 
representatives, thereby limiting the prospects for long-term corporate success.”53 To 
determine whether such broad conclusions about the German co-determination system 
are warranted, I first take a look at these claims in the context of the VW case, and 
then take a look at the broader functioning of co-determination as a governance sys-
tem.
45 R Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business 
Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007).
46 <http://www.euronews.com/2018/05/04/25-billion-euros-paid-out-in-dieselgate-scandal-and-the-
bill-is-still-rising>; <http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/dieselskandal-die-wut-der-
mitarbeiter-auf-die-vw-fuehrung-waechst/20965042.html. 
47 Charles M Elson, Craig K Ferrere and Nicholas J Goossen, The Bug at Volkswagen: Lessons in 
Co-Determination, Ownership, and Board Structure 27 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 36 (2015).
48 above.
49 above.
50 above.
51 above.
52 above. The main parties are identified as “… a dual-class controlling shareholder, the government 
as a major equity-holder, and labour representation.”
53 above.
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At VW, it was Piëch’s54 ambition to pursue a growth and profitability strategy with 
the stated ambition to make VW the No.1 in the world by conquering the US and 
selling 10 million cars per year by 201855. This strategy connected to a shared ratio-
nale in the car industry, where economies of scale and the positives of market domi-
nance are huge. As the adoption of this strategy was accompanied by strong quarterly 
growth and profit figures56, the direction chosen by Piëch was not contested by any 
party in the governance structure, including the Qatari Holding Sovereign Wealth 
Fund and the government of Lower Saxony as shareholders, the supervisory board, 
the CEO, the executives,57 and the unions.58 In addition, it was an open secret59 for 
automotive companies and for European regulators60 that emission tests were being 
gamed across the industry and that regulators in Germany, France and the UK61 had 
been noticeably slow62 in the implementation of more stringent rules for emissions 
testing. Both the government of Lower Saxony and the German federal government63 
lobbied against the development of stricter EU emission tests for years leading up to 
the governance crisis and even after the VW scandal hit, a strong lobby managed to 
considerably water down initial proposals to strengthen regulation64 and to raise sig-
nificantly the amount that could be legally emitted under new tests65.
Given the industry-wide gaming of tests, and given the lax behaviour exhibited by 
regulators, it seems safe to argue that there was little reason for engineers to think 
54 Ferdinand Piëch, chairman of the executive board of Volkswagen Group, 1993-2002 and chair-
man of the supervisory board of Volkswagen Group, 2002-2015.
55 Carl Rhodes, Democratic Business Ethics: Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal and the Disruption 
of Corporate Sovereignty 37 Organization Studies 1502 (2016).
56 At https://organizationsandsocialchange.wordpress.com/2015/10/05/is-the-volkswagen-scandal-
surprising-how-profitability-pressures-drive-corporate-misconduct/#more-666.
57 See <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fe07b240-7645-11e5-933d-efcdc3c11c89.html#axzz3qhKm
DW3M> <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/54eb7548-636c-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html#axzz3rB7Zeb1i; 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/41b1a0d6-65f8-11e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5.html#axzz3nDugtHli>; <http://
money.cnn.com/2015/09/23/news/companies/volkswagen-emissions-crisis/index.html>.
58 Elson, Ferrere and Goossen (2015) above.
59 At <http://www.autoexpress.co.uk/car-news/consumer-news/93030/exclusive-car-makers-cant-
meet-euro6-emissions-targets>.
60 See <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d593256c-78c8-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7.html#axzz3pfHbIHds>.
61 At <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/24/uk-france-and-germany-lobbied-for-
flawed-car-emissions-tests-documents-reveal%20>; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6527547.
stm>.
62 At <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/volkswagen-
corruption-crisis-isnt-a-scandal-its-a-syndrome/article26479332/?utm_medium=email&utm_
source=other&utm_campaign=notifications.auto.uo_5KnOfEeW-aBJWzh2UsQ>.
63 At <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/30/emissions-scandal-how-the-drive-for-
diesel-ran-out-of-gas>.
64 At <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/03/business/automakers-ask-europe-for-leniency-in-emis-
sions-testing.html?_r=0#> <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4a6cac80-83c5-11e5-8095-ed1a37d1e096.
html?ftcamp=crm/email/2015116/nbe/EuropeMorningHeadlines/product#axzz3qhKmDW3M> <http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/business/energy-environment/epa-expands-on-road-emissions-testing-to-
all-diesel-models.html?_r=0>.
65 At <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4a6cac80-83c5-11e5-8095-ed1a37d1e096.html?ftcamp=crm/
email/2015116/nbe/EuropeMorningHeadlines/product#axzz3qhKmDW3M>.
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they wouldn’t get away with writing some code rather than adopt a proven technol-
ogy that would have added considerable cost per vehicle. And given the perceived 
success of a focus on market dominance and the acceptance of this rationale by all 
parties present in board proceedings there also seems to have been little incentive for 
board members to control the exact choices of individual engineers. To the extent that 
the VW case shows, a pervasive conception of corporate purpose driven by overween-
ing executive ambition and intense competitive pressures; a strategy directed to and 
evaluated by short-term indicators of profitability and growth; the avoidance of 
searching questions by all parties in the supervisory board; and a lack of engagement 
with the choices of operatives in order to continue ‘business as usual’, it seems that 
the VW case may exemplify not so much a failure of the co-determination structure, 
but rather the similarity of factors that make corporate governance systems malfunc-
tion around the world.
The perspective that the VW scandal may be understood as an effect of the accep-
tance of a well-accepted rationale for directing a company, rather than as the effect 
of co-determination, allows to engage with some of the broader claims about co-
determination as a governance model. According to Elson et al. “... the German co-
determined firm appears to run the risk of becoming something of a headless state ... 
with policy largely determined in the confluence of each interest.”66 An entity view 
lens on corporate governance provides two types of arguments to put this statement 
in perspective.
First, the modern public corporation intrinsically relates to a multiplicity of inter-
ests. In the shareholder constituency, a large diversity of types of shareholders (e.g. 
retail, minority and majority, as well as controlling and non-controlling) with a mul-
tiplicity of interests and time-horizons67 may be identified. As argued above, it is 
precisely because the choice for the identification of a dominant notion of a ‘share-
holder’ interest imposes the possibility of an agency problem between shareholders68 
that company law statutes worldwide typically direct the fiduciary duties of any board 
member toward the interests of the entity and conceive of the board as a mediating 
institution with the capacity to weigh and balance conflicting interests and time-
frames69. Hence, although it is clear that contradicting interests and time-frames may 
exist in a co-determination system, an entity view lens suggests that the presence of 
66 Elson, Ferrere and Goossen  (2015) above at 41.
67 Aguilera and Jackson (2010) above at 521.
68 For this reason, in Germany “... noncurrent transactions between a firm and an interested party – 
such as a large shareholder – must be approved by the board of directors.” and “The actions of corporate 
officials that would impair the interests of shareholders – or that would favor the interests of some share-
holders at the expense of others – constitute a breach of the duty of care.” Michel Goyer, Contingent 
Capital: Short-Term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate Governance in France and Germany, 
87 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011); see also Mark Freeman, Robin Pearson and James Tay-
lor, Shareholder Democracies?: Corporate Governance in Britain and Ireland before 1850 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011); Paul Johnson, Making the Market: Victorian Origins of Corporate 
Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
69 See KJM Cremers and Simone M Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards 68 
 Stanford Law Review 67 (2016); Jaron Van Bekkum, Steven Hijink, Michael C Schouten and Jaap 
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such contradicting issues is endemic to the architecture of the modern public corpora-
tion, while the capacity to deal with such contradictions is the raison d’être for the 
position, role, and duties of the corporate board.
Second, and relatedly, the conclusion that “the German corporate organizational 
governance structure of co-determination creates an environment in which a corpora-
tion must juggle the conflicting interests of the shareholder and the labor representa-
tives, thereby limiting the prospects for long-term corporate success”70 seems to apply 
a lens that focuses one-sidedly on perceived negatives of a co-determination model 
without taking its underlying tradeoffs and potential benefits of into account. If a 
principal-agent theory lens is adopted the objective of the directors and executive 
managers, conceived as ‘agents’, is to exclusively serve the interests of the sharehold-
ers as an undivided ‘principal’71. Arguably, from this perspective issues like expected 
complications with regard to takeover and merger negotiations72; the mandatory 
nature of information, consultation and negotiation rights in the case of large-scale 
layoffs and plant closures73; the necessity for supervisory board members to take into 
account the interests and risks for broad sets of actors and time-frames and to acknowl-
edge tradeoffs and constraints; limits on the power of particular types of shareholders 
to engage; and the incapacity of executive managers to act unilaterally74 may be per-
ceived to introduce direct and indirect costs75 and to weaken the level of influence 
and control that may be exercised by capital market actors76.
However, the cost-benefit analysis presented by a co-determination system looks 
very different if the status of the corporation is not reduced to a nexus of contracts; 
if the architecture is not reduced to a dyadic, exclusive and autocratic setup between 
stylized conceptions of ‘agents’ and principals’ with undivided interests; and if cor-
porate purpose is not viewed in terms of the exclusive production of shareholder 
value. As shown above, the entity view allows to conceive of corporate architecture 
as a confluence of interests, rights and claims for corporate constituencies that are 
embedded and protected through qualified, rather than absolute claims and protec-
W  Winter, Corporate Governance in the Netherlands 14 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1, 14 
(2010).
70 Elson, Ferrere and Goossen (2015) above (emphasis added) at 42. 
71 David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 University of St.Thomas Law Journal 7 (2014).
72 Sigurt Vitols, Negotiated Shareholder Value: The German Variant of an Anglo-American Prac-
tice 8 Competition and Change 331, 370 (2004).
73 Above at 359.
74 Michel Goyer, Contingent Capital: Short-Term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate Gover-
nance in France and Germany, 137 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011); Vitols (2004) above at 
368.
75 Gregory Jackson, Stakeholders under Pressure: Corporate Governance and Labour Management 
in Germany and Japan 13 Corporate Governance: An International Review 419, 421 (2005).; Jean J Du 
Plessis, Bernhard Grossfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock and Matthias Casper, Ger-
man Corporate Governance in International and European Context (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012).
76 Aguilera and Jackson (2010) above at 526; Christine Windbichler. Cheers and Boos for Employee 
Involvement: Co-Determination as Corporate Governance Conundrum 6 European Business Organiza-
tion Law Review (2005).
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tions. The effects of such a qualified view of claims and protections shows itself in 
all aspects of co-determination and its institutional embedding.
To start with, the capacity to nominate directors is typically not absolute. In the 
Netherlands, the ‘structure regime’ stipulates that only corporations with at least 100 
employees in the Netherlands and 16 million euros in assets allow works councils 
enhanced right of recommendation with respect to one-third of the members of the 
supervisory board. Nomination of the full board of directors may be vetoed at the 
AGM by a simple majority of the votes cast representing at least one-third of the 
issued share capital.77 Similarly, in Germany, only one version of co-determination 
mandates that “an equal number of representatives are appointed by the employees 
or their representatives and the shareholders.”78 However, even in this version share-
holders retain 50% of the vote and the chair retains the right to cast a decisive vote,79 
providing an ultimate advantage for shareholder-nominated members of the board.80
Co-determination rights are similarly qualified, rather than absolute81. Because 
such qualified powers work best if positive relationships are maintained, all parties 
involved in the co-determination structure, including employee representatives, have 
an interest to focus on the strategic and long-term use of such rights and claims, rather 
than engage in short-term antagonistic engagement.82 The presence of such a focus 
was exemplified when in Germany, after the GFC, unions and employers worked 
together to keep costs down, for instance by using overtime to pay for a four-day 
workweek.83 In the light of the willingness of employee representatives to cooperate 
with management to find mutually beneficial and cooperative solutions in order to 
safeguard a companies’ viability and thereby prevent job losses,84 Goyer argues that 
labour representatives on boards in Germany have effectively become “... co-manag-
77 See Frank J De Graaf and Cor A Herkstroeter, How Corporate Social Performance Is Institution-
alised Within the Governance Structure 74 Journal of Business Ethics 181 (2007); Jaron Van Bekkum, 
Steven Hijink, Michael C Schouten and Jaap W Winter, Corporate Governance in the Netherlands 14 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law1, 17 (2010).
78 Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard Grossfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock and Mat-
thias Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context, 94 (Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2012).
79 Above.
80 Michel Goyer, Contingent Capital: Short-Term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate Gover-
nance in France and Germany, 32, 136, 137 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Henry Hansmann 
and Reinier Kraakman, Reflections on the End of History for Corporate Law in Rasheed A Abdul and 
T Yoshikawa (eds.), The Convergence of Corporate Governance (Houndmills and New York: Springer, 
2012).
81 Michel Goyer, Contingent Capital: Short-Term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate Gov-
ernance in France and Germany, 137 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
82 Michel Goyer, Contingent Capital: Short-Term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate Gov-
ernance in France and Germany, 137 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011).
83 Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard Grossfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock and 
Matthias Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context, 191, 271 
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2012); http://www.waz-online.de/Wolfsburg/Volkswagen/Vor-20-Jahren-Vier-
Tage-Woche-rettete-30.000-VW-Arbeitsplaetze; https://www.boeckler.de/wsi-tarifarchiv_3267.htm.
84 Vitols (2004), above at 368.  
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ers” of the firm in the implementation of painful restructuring measures and the 
elaboration of new strategic business decisions.”85 and “... management [in Germany] 
seeks to incorporate works councils in restructuring schemes from the beginning.”86
Finally, a qualified notion of constituency rights allows to recognize that co-deter-
mination is oriented toward the provision of nomination, information and consultation 
rights to corporate constituencies. Although nomination rights are the most ‘visible’ 
of these rights, it is specifically information and consultation rights that are considered 
important,87 and specifically so in the context of changes in economic context or the 
ownership structure88 that potentially provide a significant threat to incomplete 
aspects of contracts89 and any prior commitments made with regard to engagement 
with broader actors, interests and time-frames.90
Further support for the adoption of a co-determination model is provided by a 
broader economic analysis. While a negative relation between employee voice and 
share prices has not been corroborated,91 it has been reported that at the firm level the 
provision of institutional protections for illiquid, non-diversifiable and firm-specific 
investments by employees is linked to the improvement of stable employment 
relations,92 improved productivity, employee commitment and reduced labor turn-
over93, the preservation of firm-specific human capital94 and the effective implemen-
tation of quick turnarounds95. For such reasons, Fauver and Fuerst (2006:703) note 
that: “prudent levels of employee representation on corporate boards can increase 
firm efficiency and market value”96. Beyond companies, the presence of an effective 
co-determination system in a jurisdiction has been linked to maintaining an emphasis 
85 Michel Goyer, Contingent Capital: Short-Term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate Gov-
ernance in France and Germany, 138 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); see also Gregory Jack-
son, Stakeholders under Pressure: Corporate Governance and Labour Management in Germany and 
Japan 13 Corporate Governance: An International Review 419, 425 (2005).
86 Goyer (2011) above at 138.
87 Van Bekkum, Hijink, Schouten and Winter (2010) at 18; Vitols (2004) above at 362. 
88 Van Bekkum, Hijink, Schouten and Winter (2010) at 16.
89 Andrei Shleifer, and Lawrence H Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers in Alan J Auer-
bach (ed.), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1988); Georgina Tsagas, A Long-Term Vision for UK Firms? Revisiting the Target Director’s Advisory 
Role Since the Takeover of Cadbury’s PLC 14 Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2014).
90 Sanford M Jacoby, The Embedded Corporation: Corporate Governance and Employment Rela-
tions in Japan and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
91 Aguilera and Jackson (2010) above at 526.
92 Jackson (2005) above at 421.
93 Aguilera and Jackson (2010) above at 526.
94 Aguilera and Jackson (2010) above at 526. See also Konstantin Bottenberg, Anja Tuschke and 
Miriam Flickinger, Corporate Governance Between Shareholder and Stakeholder Orientation: Lessons 
from Germany 26 Journal of Management Inquiry (2017).
95 Aguilera and Jackson (2010) above at 499.
96 Larry Fauver and Michael E Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Rep-
resentation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards 82 Journal of Financial Economics 703 (2006).
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on training and skilled work and the lessening of conflictual industrial relations and 
industrial action97.
Such positive associations with co-determination provide the basis for a continuing 
support in policy circles. The co-determination system has been hailed as a “… fun-
damental achievement in German socio-economic legislation”98 which is considered 
a source of pride for many parties, including managers and politicians99. The German 
Supreme Court in Civil Matters stated in 1982 that “The Co-determination Act of 
1976 stretches beyond the interests of the persons immediately affected by it, the Co-
determination Act of 1976 does indeed serve the common weal of the community 
(…)”100. And in the aftermath of the GFC the presence of a “decade old consensus-
building management system” that allowed for the development of consensual pro-
grams was still touted as particularly beneficial101. Positive views on co-determination 
have also traveled further as the EU SE “Employees’ Directive clearly follows the 
German co-determination model”102 and UK Prime Minister Theresa May briefly 
called for the inclusion of both employees and customers on boards in the UK103.
The discussion in this section shows how the application of a principal-agent 
theory lens might lead to the depiction of a co-determination system as the creation 
of a ‘headless state’ with the potential to introduce structural antagonism in the board 
and significant costs to shareholders. The application of an entity view, in contrast, 
allows to approach co-determination as an architecture that fits well within the history 
of ideas that shaped the specific ideas of status, architecture, and purpose that enabled 
the effects of the modern corporation. In relation to an entity view, it makes sense 
that a (supervisory) board is endowed with discretionary space and duties toward the 
corporation in toto; that corporate constituencies viewed as ‘organs’ receive qualified 
claims, protections and information, nomination and consultation rights104 and that 
the resulting organizational architecture provides a system of institutionalised checks 
and balances. From the perspective that all corporate ‘organs’ stand to gain from 
continued cooperation within such an architecture, the provision of such an institu-
97 Michel Goyer, Contingent Capital: Short-Term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate Gov-
ernance in France and Germany, 138 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Frank J De Graaf and 
Cor A Herkstroeter, How Corporate Social Performance is Institutionalised Within the Governance 
Structure 74 Journal of Business Ethics (2007); Sanford M Jacoby, The Embedded Corporation: Cor-
porate Governance and Employment Relations in Japan and the United States (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005).
98 Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard Grossfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock and Mat-
thias Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context, 165 (Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2012).
99 Above at 13, 14, 191.
100 Above at 166.
101 Above at 191, 271.
102 Above at 233.
103 At <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/nov/21/theresa-may-force-firms-appoint-work
ers-boards-cbi>; <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/nils-pratley-on-fiEnance/2016/jul/11/theresa-
may-plan-workers-boardroom-reform-extraordinary-tories>.
104 Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard Grossfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock and Mat-
thias Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context, 18 (Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2012).
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tional structure prevents, rather than induces, antagonistic, rash, or one-sided deci-
sion-making.105 Co-determination thus provides an example of a corporate architecture 
based on an entity view that can provide significant organizational and economic 
benefits.
4. Discussion: The Entity View, Co-Determination, and Beyond
To understand the conditions that frame whether corporate boards may include 
broader actors, interests, and time-frames in corporate strategy, I have explored the 
potential of an entity view and co-determination. I showed how an entity view pro-
vides a specific view of corporate architecture that endows the board, as a corporate 
organ, with the discretionary space to take into account all actors, risks and interests 
and time-frames that affect the corporation. In relation to such a view of corporate 
architecture, external institutions may be granted the capacity to adjudicate between 
corporate constituencies and to remind the board of their duties toward broader actors, 
interests and time-frames. I then showed how co-determination fits well within a his-
tory of ideas that underpins the entity view and may serve as an example of a corpo-
rate architecture that provides institutionalised checks and balances through which 
antagonistic, rash, or one-sided decision-making may be prevented. Together, these 
approaches provide both a theoretical and a practical basis to critique a dominant view 
of corporate governance as a dyadic, exclusive and autocratic setup between stylized 
conceptions of key actors that excludes consideration of broad sets of corporate and 
societal risks and, instead, to develop polycentric and multi-level models and institu-
tions in the field of corporate governance106 that may help to include the interests and 
risks of broader sets of actors, interests, and time-frames in corporate strategy.
Despite their merits, however, the discussion in this article provided good reasons 
to treat neither the entity view nor co-determination as a panacea. I explored in sec-
tion two how the absence of a positive identification of purpose in combination with 
the perceived presence of prioritized rights to the shareholder constituency in com-
pany law limited the capacity to counter the displacement of entity view-based notions 
with a new theory of corporate governance based on stylized and reductive social 
norms of status, architecture and purpose. And as these notions of status, architecture 
and purpose continue to be inserted into standards, norms, and ‘best practices’ in 
national and transnational institutions such as corporate governance codes, competi-
105 The object of the Enterprise Chamber is, similarly, to provide the means by which a reasonable 
solution may be effectuated: “through a process of preserving the status quo, denying management 
and shareholders from taking irreversible acts and instructing the parties to continue to find a solu-
tion, where necessary aided by independent outsiders.” in Van Bekkum, Hijink, Schouten and Winter 
(2010) above at 14.
106 See Peer Zumbansen and Daniel Saam, The ECJ, Volkswagen and European Corporate Law: 
Reshaping the European Varieties of Capitalism 8 German LJ (2007).; Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard 
Grossfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock and Matthias Casper, German Corporate 
Governance in International and European Context, 5 (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012); Lorraine Tal-
bot, Critical Company Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008).
JEROEN VELDMAN296
tion law and accounting standards,107 they continue to have an impact on the institu-
tional contexts in which co-determination systems are embedded,108 including in the 
countries in Continental Europe where different models for corporate architecture 
used to be prevalent.
Another reason to think beyond the entity view and co-determination is that the 
provision of an architecture like co-determination institutionalizes checks and safe-
guards at a systemic level, but does not by itself provide guarantees for the behaviour 
of specific actors. In the VW case, the government of Lower Saxony and the Qatari 
SWF109 held 12.4% and 15.4% of the shares respectively. The failure of such sophis-
ticated shareholders with considerable positions, good access to information and 
broad incentives and capacities to control and engage110 in a timely and efficient man-
ner with the conditions that led to the VW scandal is problematic, both in terms of 
their lack of fulfillment of their oversight role as prudent self-interested investors with 
board representation and in terms of the lack of fulfillment of a ‘stewardship’ role 
attributed to these institutional investors. Likewise, reports indicate that labour rep-
resentatives in the VW board ‘succumbed to the temptations of patronage and privi-
lege’111, giving cause to question how and why these labour nominated directors 
became coopted and what role this played in their lack of engagement. Finally, to the 
extent that both state and federal governments acted as loyal proponents of VWs 
strategy,112 they failed to act and control for broader interests than just VW’s. The 
fact that all parties present in the VW board failed to engage sufficiently with the 
107 Goyer identifies “an industry of best corporate governance practices – most notably in the form 
of codes” in which best practice with regard to the use of specific elements and arrangements is directly 
linked to unlocking shareholder value, such as “boards of directors composed of nonexecutive/indepen-
dent directors; sub-board committees (audit, nomination, and remuneration) dominated by independent 
directors; voting rights characterized by the one-share-one-vote principle; extensive range of issues for 
which shareholder approval is needed; heightened financial transparency that enables shareholders to 
evaluate the situation of listed companies; and extensive pay disclosure of executives that is comprised 
of a significant variable components.” Michel Goyer, Contingent Capital: Short-Term Investors and the 
Evolution of Corporate Governance in France and Germany, 92-93 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
2011). For a broader overview of the pervasiveness of the introduction of such notions into transna-
tional institutions see Cremers and Sepe (2016) above at 136; Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard Grossfeld, 
Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock and Matthias Casper, German Corporate Governance 
in International and European Context, 5 (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012).; Umakanth Varottil, Corporate 
Governance in India: The Transition from Code to Statute in JJ du Plessis and CK Low (eds.), Corpo-
rate Governance Codes for the 21st Century: International Perspectives and Critical Analyses (Cham: 
Springer, 2017); Jeroen Veldman, Self-Regulation in International Corporate Governance Codes in Du 
Plessis and Low (2017) above.
108 P Ireland. Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth 68 The Modern Law Review 
49-50 (2005); Michel Goyer, Contingent Capital: Short-Term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate 
Governance in France and Germany, 93 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011).
109 Elson, Ferrere and Goossen (2015) above.
110 See Cremers and Sepe (2016) above at 125.
111 At <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/23/volkswagen-temptations-patronage-
privilege-martin-winterkorn>; See also Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard Grossfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo 
Saenger, Otto Sandrock and Matthias Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and 
European Context (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012).
112 <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34400305>.
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corporate and systemic risks related to the emissions scandal exemplifies the fact that 
the implementation of a co-determination model may provide a structure that ampli-
fies the possibility for outcomes at a systemic level. But at an operational level the 
presence of a co-determination model is, in itself, neither a determinant nor a guaran-
tor for adequate behavior by parties in the board or in the broader institutional system 
in which co-determination is embedded.
A more general reason to think beyond the entity view is that the successful imple-
mentation and operation of a co-determination system relies on idiosyncratic and 
path-dependent factors.113 In a comparison between France and Germany, Goyer 
shows how the capacity to keep the influence of (short-term) types of investors and 
investor strategies at bay must not be sought in formal ownership and control 
structures,114 including blockholding control and co-determination. Rather, this capac-
ity must be sought in the capacity for factual control115 that is embedded in the orga-
nization in specific arrangements of “structures of authority at the firm-level.”116 In 
addition, a variety of groups at the national level, notably labour unions, political 
elites, and business elites need to provide ongoing support117 to sustain this type of 
corporate governance model. The successful implementation and maintainance of a 
co-determination system thus needs a continuous ‘fit’ with systems of rights and 
obligations both at the workplace level118 and at a jurisdictional level,119 which asks 
for the development of idiosyncratic solutions that fit the existing and evolving insti-
tutions in a jurisdiction. The combination of path-dependency and idiosyncrasy draws 
attention to the fact that transplantation or emulation of a successful model for co-
determination may be more complicated than a simple transplantation of legal rules120 
and potentially provides an explanation for why co-determination systems have pro-
vided mixed results in European jurisdictions.121
113 Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard Grossfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock and 
Matthias Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context, 473 (Heidel-
berg: Springer, 2012); Frank J De Graaf and Cor A Herkstroeter, How Corporate Social Performance is 
Institutionalised Within the Governance Structure 74 Journal of Business Ethics 179 (2007); Aguilera 
and Jackson (2010) above at 530.
114 Michel Goyer, Contingent Capital: Short-Term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate Gov-
ernance in France and Germany, 164 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011).
115 Michel Goyer, Contingent Capital: Short-Term Investors and the Evolution of Corporate Gov-
ernance in France and Germany, 164 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011)
116 Above at 160.
117 Frank J De Graaf and Cor A Herkstroeter, How Corporate Social Performance is Institutionalised 
Within the Governance Structure 74 Journal of Business Ethics (2007); Goyer (2011) above.
118 Jackson (2005) above at 426; Aguilera and Jackson (2010) at 500. 
119 De Graaf and Herkstroeter (2007) above at 188; J Du Plessis and A Rühmkorf, New Trends 
Regarding Sustainability and Integrated Reporting for Companies: What Protection Do Directors 
Have? 36 Company Lawyer 51 (2015).
120 Jean J Du Plessis, Bernhard Grossfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto Sandrock and Mat-
thias Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context, 13 (Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2012); Umakanth Varottil, Corporate Governance in India: The Transition from Code to 
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The combination of an absence of positive purpose and a related weak position in 
relation to the development of alternative theories and their insertion into transna-
tional institutions; an effective operation at systemic, rather than operational level 
and, hence, a vulnerability to legitimation issues in response to individual cases like 
VW; and path-dependence with idiosyncrasy as a result means that neither the entity 
theory nor co-determination can be treated as panacea for the redevelopment of cor-
porate governance theory and practice. Rather, they provide points of departure that 
help conceive of a more ‘open’ and empirical approach to the development of corpo-
rate governance.122 Such an open approach may draw further inspiration from mul-
tiple legal models for organisational and legal representation, for instance from 
closely held or family firms, cooperatives, benefit corporations, trusts, partnerships, 
SOEs as well as models developed in the Social Enterprise literature, including the 
Benefit Corporation, Social Purpose Corporation, cooperatives and fairshares.123 I 
will briefly consider how particular aspects of the elements and architectures underly-
ing corporate governance may be strengthened and rearranged in order to recognise, 
embed and enforce a positive conception of organizational purpose.
Governance documents including constitutional documents such as articles of 
association124 provide one means by which a positive conception of purpose may be 
embedded and made enforceable for broader constituencies.125 Following the Profit 
with Purpose approach, commitment to purpose may be strengthened by requiring 
super-majoritarian shareholders’ approval for the change or repeal of the purpose. In 
addition, some stakeholders may be granted the right to enforce the specified purpose, 
and to sue the corporation for breaches of commitment126. A broader conception of 
purpose and the interests and risks involved, including those that are ESG related, 
can also be translated into concrete policy goals that, in turn, can be coupled to KPIs 
and executive remuneration structures127. Finally, the standing given to corporate 
thias Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context, 13 (Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2012); Christine Windbichler. Cheers and Boos for Employee Involvement: Co-Determination 
as Corporate Governance Conundrum 6 European Business Organization Law Review (2005).
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Chinese Listed Companies 46 Hong Kong Law Journal (2015); B Cheffins, History and the Global 
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Duff and Mike Bull, Understanding Social Enterprise: Theory and Practice (London: Sage, 2015).
124 De Graaf and Herkstroeter (2007) above at 188; Lorraine Talbot, Critical Company Law (Abing-
don: Routledge, 2008).
125 De Graaf and Herkstroeter (2007) above at 188; Nicole Notat and Jean-Dominique Senard, 
L’entreprise, objet d’intérêt collectif (2018), retrieved 12-6-2018 at https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/
files/PDF/2018/entreprise_objet_interet_collectif.pdf .
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‘organs’ by an institution like the Enterprise chamber in the Netherlands128 could 
conceivably be expanded to include relevant actors representing broader sets of actors, 
interests, and timeframes.
The role and influence of different types of shareholders may also be reconsidered. 
Principal-agent theory identifies a ‘principal’, i.e. a unitary body of shareholders with 
an undivided interest,129 typically interpreted as the interest of a trader interested in 
short-term market-value optimization.130 The resulting view of shareholders as an 
undivided body and of short-term market value optimization as the exclusive object 
for managerial agency strongly affects the capacity for boards to consider actors, 
interests, and time-frames beyond these stylized conceptions and enhances the capac-
ity to renege on commitments to such other actors, interests and time-frames: “Share-
holders, attempting to maximize the value of their holdings, cannot credibly commit 
to not remove the board or dump their shares upon an early drop in performance … 
directors and managers tend to develop short-termist incentives – and much more 
pervasively than shareholder advocates have previously acknowledged.”131 According 
to Cremers and Sepe132 this has consequences beyond the public corporation: “weaker 
boards and stronger shareholders are likely to exacerbate the shareholders’ limited-
commitment problem, with detrimental effects for both shareholders and society as 
a whole.”
Both the theoretical misconception of the status and role of the shareholder con-
stituency and the board133 and the broad effects of this stylistic reinterpretation may 
provide the basis for developing a more empirical approach to the wide heterogeneity 
of interests and time-frames related to differing share positions, share rights and 
capacity for engagement134. A reconsideration of the notion that “… shareholders do 
not constitute a homogeneous block, and the identities, interests, and policy agendas 
of shareholders may themselves change over time”135 provides a first step to recon-
sider both the relevance of the multiple interests and risks related to multiple actors 
and time-frames from a shareholder perspective and of board discretion in relation to 
the uptake of such interests and risks. By extension, such an approach allows to con-
sider how directors engaging with such broader risks and interests may be protected 
against derivative actions136 by shareholders with a much narrower interest; how the 
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embedding of a specific purpose in corporate structure can be strengthened by the 
appraisal and selection of shareholders; and how differentiated engagement rights can 
be accorded to shareholders with different holding periods.137
The development of these means is interesting, as they allow to legitimize and 
protect directors adopting a positive conception of corporate purpose and yet maintain 
a high degree of managerial accountability. In combination with a reconsideration of 
the entity view such means can strengthen the combined capacity of directors, inves-
tors, and regulators to determine and engage with a positive purpose; to monitor 
corporate strategy in relation to the interests and risks of broad actors and time-frames; 
and to engage with the risks of excessive risk-taking to the long-term value creation 
potential of the modern corporation.138
5. Conclusions
The capacity to consider specific actors, interests and time-frames in the strategy of 
the modern public corporation is centrally related to the way the status, architecture 
and purpose of the modern corporation as a social construct are conceived and stabi-
lized. The VW scandal as well as the Global Financial Crisis and its aftermath made 
it abundantly clear139 that the exclusive focus on the interests of executive managers 
and short-term market value-oriented shareholders and the externalisation of risks 
introduced by a theoretical view of the status and architecture of the modern corpora-
tion that has been described as “aspirational rather than grounded in corporate law”140 
presents significant costs and risks to all other actors, interests, and time-frames 
involved in the theory and practice of corporate governance. The entity view and co-
determination both allow to conceive of corporate status, architecture and purpose in 
a way that allows directors to consider risks and interests relevant to broader actors 
and time-frames. Beyond the entity view and co-determination, an open approach to 
corporate governance allows to challenge stylistic depictions of status, architecture 
and purpose and develop more empirical and creative ways to conceive of organiza-
tional architectures and institutions. In this paper, I have shown how such an open 
approach to corporate governance provides means by which boards may develop, 
embed, and safeguard a positive conception of corporate status, architecture, and 
purpose that support an engagement with sustainability and long-termism.
137 Jeroen Veldman, Paige Morrow and Filip Gregor, Corporate Governance for a Changing World: 
Final Report of a Global Roundtable Series (London and Brussels: Frank Bold and Cass Business 
School, 2016).
138 Aguilera and Jackson (2010) above at 534-535.
139 Frank J De Graaf and Cynthia A Williams, The Intellectual Foundations of the Global Financial 
Crisis: Analysis and Proposals for Reform in CA Williams and P Zumbansen (eds.), The Embedded 
Firm: Corporate Governance, Labor, and Finance Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011); Aguilera and Jackson (2010) above at 521.
140 David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy 10 University of St. Thomas Law Journal 33 (2014).
